Bush CSG arrived CENTCOM AOR Apr 24 after 10-day Africa routing — avoiding the Iranian ASBM envelope through the Mediterranean. Three carriers on station simultaneously for the first time since 2003 Iraq. CENTCOM's public confirmation is itself the signal: the operational security premium of ambiguity has been traded for the coercive premium of declared mass. 62 C-17/C-5M airlift sorties in 4 days — a logistics surge consistent with pre-positioning consumables for a multi-week ground campaign, not a single strike. The 2003 template: 3-CSG concentration preceded a ground invasion within weeks. BIF-1 gate +6 to 78%.

Layer 1 observable. UKMTO issued advisories for kinetic incidents in Hormuz approaches — the maritime safety authority does not issue these for ambiguous events. OSINT confirms IRGC FIAC (fast inshore attack craft) dispersal from Bandar Abbas, active mine-laying in Hormuz approaches, and TEL repositioning to pre-surveyed coastal launch sites. Iran is preparing a prepared-defender scenario during the ceasefire window. This is the single most consequential signal for Branch B dominance: the landing force will face an Iran that used the ceasefire to optimize its coastal defense geometry. Swift Capture collapses: A drops from 14 to 9%. Branch B rises to 62%. Mine-laying timeline also extends the operational prep window — Branch C +1 to 29%.

Trump publicly named USS Bush arrival in CENTCOM AOR as the trigger for ceasefire termination. Combined with Bush's 10-day Africa routing (visible on AIS from Suez refusal through Cape of Good Hope), and Chinese TEE-01B satellite providing Iran real-time carrier tracking, three conditions for Swift Capture are eliminated simultaneously: (1) strategic surprise is impossible when the trigger is named, (2) tactical surprise is impossible when China feeds Iran the carrier's position, (3) operational surprise is impossible when the routing adds 10 observable days. The ceasefire is not a pause — it is a publicly announced staging window with a known end condition. Every hour of ceasefire is an hour Iran uses for coastal defense preparation. BIF-1 gate +2 from this signal alone. Branch A collapses -2 to single digits.

Civilian evacuation from Bushehr nuclear site underway. IRNA reports 'precautionary relocation' of non-essential personnel. Satellite imagery shows vehicle convoys departing the Bushehr compound on multiple days. This signal operates on two levels: (1) for BIF-1 — it confirms both sides expect kinetic escalation, adding +2 to the gate; (2) for BIF-2 — it shifts the TNW Gate internal distribution, with Stalemate dropping -4 to 29% because evacuation is movement, not stasis. All three pipeline perspectives (Analyst, Skeptic, Adversary) agreed: evacuation of a nuclear site is incompatible with the Stalemate thesis. Conventional Collapse (MOP plausibility + spent fuel vulnerability hypothesis) rises +2 to 37%. Blocked Internally +1 as Trump's public disavowal of nuclear options strengthens institutional resistance pathways.

The Skeptic's counter-signal. While Pentagon plans a ground operation to complete the L0 energy monopoly, the financial architecture enabling that monopoly is eroding in real time. 80% of Iran's remaining oil exports now flow to China. India — a nominal US partner — is settling Iranian oil purchases in yuan through intermediary banks. Russia-Iran axis deepened: Moscow secured preferential Hormuz transit fee exemption, building multi-corridor logistics that survive any war outcome. IEA's 'greatest energy security threat in history' declaration + Panama Canal at 40-day wait prove Hormuz irreplaceability — but the rerouting infrastructure being built is yuan-denominated, not dollar-denominated. The structural residue of this war will be a hardened non-dollar payment network for 30%+ of global oil trade. US Monopoly endgame -3 to 9%. Fragmentation +1 from this cluster (capped from +2 by narrative inertia — 4th consecutive Frag increase). Russian exports down 16.1% by volume but revenue partially offset by elevated Brent — the price trap cuts both ways.